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“Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are
due and when you judge between people to judge with justice.
Excellent is that which Allah instructs you. Indeed, Allah is ever
Hearing and Seeing.” The Nobel Quran 4:58
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ABSTRACT
This research studied the relationship between the degree of civilian control, in military
dominated political systems, and military effectiveness in combating insurgency using
comparative case study analysis of Turkey and Pakistan and their conflict with the Kurdistan
Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Taliban Movement in Pakistan (TTP) respectively. In
contemporary world, many states e.g. Ukraine, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Saudi Arabia are
involved in irregular warfare with insurgencies which are threatening domestic security and
disturbing global peace. On another front, many states, especially in the Middle East and Africa,
are facing the problem of disturbed civil-military relations or weak civilian control over the
military. The degree of civilian control and military effectiveness in combating insurgency, are
studied and compared, in eight distinct cases from the recent history of Turkey and Pakistan.
Military effectiveness in combating insurgency was studied in all cases using data, about
insurgency attack incidents, extracted from the Global Terrorism Database. Comparing Turkey
and Pakistan generally, the study found that Turkey is superior to Pakistan in the degree of
civilian control and military effectiveness which proposes a positive relationship between the
two variables. Comparing the Turkish cases against each other, however, marginalized this claim
when this positive relationship was overshadowed by other factors e.g. a destabilized
neighboring country or organizational confusion in insurgency’s ranks. Hoping to fill a gap in
present literature about civil-military relations and military effectiveness, this thesis proved
evidence on the weak positive relationship between civilian control, in military-dominated
political systems, and military effectiveness in combating insurgency.

Keywords:
military effectiveness - civil-military relations – counterinsurgency – irregular warfare – Turkey
– Pakistan – PKK – Taliban Pakistan – civilian control over the military – terrorism –
international peace and Security
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

I-

Introduction:

One of the most important variables in international affairs, in determining status and position of
states in international arena, is the state’s ability to conduct war, or in other words, its military
effectiveness (Beckley, 2010, p. 45). In contemporary world, the nature of warfare is
increasingly changing and developing. Direct confrontations between conventional armies of
nation states are becoming of less significance than before. On the other hand, the problem of
non-state insurgency and terrorist groups, is facing a lot of states both domestically and
internationally e.g. in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Therefore, a thorough examination of the
factors affecting military effectiveness against non-state actors in irregular warfare, is one of the
most important areas of research which meets the needs of many states, international
organizations and think tanks working in the field of international peace and security. The
sweeping waves of democratization, regime change and the persistence of some autocratic
regimes, also, are in the center stage of international events, especially in the Middle East and
Africa. In this thesis, this project is addressing both international concerns, namely, civil-military
relations and military effectiveness against non-state insurgency. To be more specific, this thesis
examines the relationship between the degree of civilian control in military-dominated political
systems and military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency, using comparative case study
analysis of Turkey and Pakistan and their conflict with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the
Taliban Movement in Pakistan (TTP) respectively. The researcher believes, through this
approach, important lessons can be learned in the fields of civil-military relations and counter1

insurgency strategies. We hope that this thesis would add to the global understanding of the
relationship between civil-military relations and military effectiveness in the context of irregular
warfare with non-state actors.
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II-

Research question:

To examine the influence of increasing the degree of civilian control on military effectiveness in
irregular warfare against non-state actors, this thesis asks one principle question; does increasing
the degree of civilian control, in military-dominated political systems, have a positive impact on
military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency?, and if true, what is the strength of that
impact ?
Answering this question, for different cases of Turkey and Pakistan, would advance our
understanding about the nature of irregular warfare and counter-insurgency efforts and its
relationship with regime type and more specifically, with civil-military balance in autocracies
especially, those which are dominated by their military establishment. A number of states, which
witnessed a turbulent history of civil-military imbalance, are also facing an unprecedented
insurgency threats. A small example of these states includes, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria,
Yemen, Libya, Turkey and Pakistan. If the result of this question proved to be positive, then, it
would be essential for these states and, others with similar circumstances, to pay a great attention
to the effect of their troubled civil-military relations on their efforts to combat growing
insurgencies within their respective jurisdiction which is threatening domestic security, distorting
internal peace and degrading their position and status in international arena.
Positive answers to this question, would also urge other states, with stable democratic systems
and a solid civil-military balance, to make every effort to encourage civilian control in troubled
states, in order to boast international peace and security and prevent dangerous insurgency
spillover effects.

3

III-

Client Description :

The results of this thesis can benefit a wide range of international organizations and think tanks.
The most significant of these organizations is the United Nations, specifically, the secretariat and
the Security Council.
This project can be used by different offices and departments of UN general secretariat, which is
engaged in different conflict resolution and regime formation efforts in many places in the world
including Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. These countries are expected to face substantial
insurgency threats, even after establishing vital state institutions, and therefore, the results of this
thesis can encourage them to give significant attention to civil-military balance in their future
governmental systems, in order to improve their chances in suppressing these predicted threats.
In its continuous efforts in establishing global peace and security, the UN Security Council, can
use the results of this thesis, to advice concerned governments, on the best degree of civilian
control needed to increase these states’ ability to combat non-state violent actors. The Security
Council also, on the basis of this project, can pressure autocratic governments to promote civilian
control, in order to increase its effectiveness in combating terrorism and subsequently prevent its
spillover to other countries.
A think tank interested in civil-military relations, military effectiveness or general international
peace and security issues, can benefit from this study. Examples of such think tanks may include
International Institute for strategic Studies (IISS) and Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace
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CHAPTER TWO
Research Design

I-

Literature review:

A consistent examination of the questions in hand requires a reliable definition of two terms, the
degree of civilian control and military effectiveness in combating insurgencies. Many
scholars tried to explore what degree and form of civilian control over the military is the most
suitable for performing different functions of a state, including its ability to conduct war.
Samuel P. Huntington, described his idea about this as “objective civil control” which he claimed
to be a characteristic of the most advanced democracies (Huntington, 1995). In his view, this
relationship should be based on four attributes, 1- a high level of military professionalism and an
understanding by the military leadership of the limits of that professionalism, 2- the effective
control over the military by a civil authority in which lies the power of making ultimate military
and foreign policy decisions., 3- the respect of this civil authority to a certain level of military
professionalism and autonomy, which results in 4- a minimum intervention of the military into
politics and vice versa (Huntington, 1995).
Richard Kohn (1997) offered a theoretical definition of civilian control. He explained it to be the
placement of all decisions of the government including those related to national security in the
hands of civilians, that is, all decisions including security related ones are to be made or
approved by civilians outside the military establishment (Kohn, 1997, p. 142). Then he
acknowledged that, this theoretical definition is quite different from reality. In reality, he argued,
militaries in all countries were able to secure some degree of control or autonomy especially in
5

issues relating to the internal management of the military or conducting war. This is mainly due
to the complex nature of modern day wars requiring an increasing degree of professionalism
(Kohn, 1997, p. 142). He finally described civilian control as a process rather than a fact and that
the best way to understand, measure or evaluate it, is by examining the relative influence of
military officers and civilian officials in decisions related to war, internal or external security and
military policy (Kohn, 1997, p. 143).
Douglas L. Bland (1999) admitted that the answer to the present question, what is the best form
of civilian control ?, is not obvious as many may think (Bland, 1999, p. 7). He also
acknowledged the weakness or the entire absence of a theoretical framework which academics or
policy makers alike can rely on (Bland, 1999, p. 9). For the previous reasons and others, Bland
tried to come up with a comprehensive theory of civil-military relations which is independent
from the confines of narrow specific national problems and in the same time evading limitations
of previous theories (Bland, 1999, p. 10). He called his theory “the theory of shared
responsibility”. In his theory, Bland argued that civil-military relations should be based on an
explicit or implicit regime around which actor expectations coverage. It is through examining the
dynamics of this regime, its norms, principles, rules and procedures, one can truly test the reality
of civil control and know the balance of power between civilians and the military (Bland, 1999,
pp. 15-18). Bland also addressed the importance of accountability in such regime. He explained
that, for civil control to be real, civilians should be able to hold military commanders responsible
for their actions and the dynamics of the regime should be able to demonstrate this accountability
(Bland, 1999, p. 20). Most importantly he advocated using the term “civilian direction of the
military” rather than “civilian control”. He explained that civilians can ensure adequate
directions of the military through establishing a regime that acknowledges the role of the military
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in national defense and stating the norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures
which govern the shared responsibility between civilians and military (Bland, 1999, p. 19).
All the aforementioned studies, Bland to a lesser extent, addressed the problem of civilian
control from the perspective of established democracies rather than military-dominated political
systems, which this study try to examine. However, the researcher have used these different
theories about civilian control in western democracies, and the next, about civilian control in
autocracies, in developing his four flanged criteria upon which he examines the degree of
civilian control during each of our cases (time periods) in the history of Turkey and Pakistan (see
methodology).
The issue of civilian control over the military in military-dominated political systems is
addressed by Steven Cook (2007) who discussed the absence of civilian control in autocracies
like Egypt, Algeria and Turkey (Cook, 2007). Cook argued that military officers may wield a
great amount of influence through maintaining control over specific policy areas such as national
security and foreign policy without even leaving their barracks (Cook, 2007, p. 8) he argued that,
in these respective states, the military dominates the decision and policy making in all issues
regarding security and foreign policy. He established that, in these countries, even if the military
allows a certain degree of political openness and establish a façade of democratic institutions,
they (the high command of the military) are unlikely to abandon their long-held interests in areas
of national security and foreign policy, to the extent that they will be willing to use forceful
interventions, if necessary, cracking down the democratic process if they feel that these interests
are threatened.
Risa Brooks (2009) explained civil-military relations in autocracies as a balance of power
between civilian leaders and military commanders (Brooks, 2006). However Brooks used a
7

combination of three factors which determines where this balance of power lies. Two of these
factors are related to the military, firstly the influence of the military commanders in society and
their connections with social forces, secondly the unity of the officer corps. The third factor is
related to the social support of civilian leaders and the solidarity of their civil base (Brooks,
2006, pp. 403-405).
Paul Staniland (2008) used a trilogy of three factors, which he believed to predict patterns of
military intervention in politics (Staniland, 2008, pp. 332-341). Derived from different theories
of civilian control and military interventions e.g. theories of external/internal threats, domestic
political culture, institutionalization ……etc. , Staniland trilogy of factors consists of 1) threat
perception of the military, 2) civilian government legitimacy, 3) the degree of institutionalization
in the political regime. Based on these three causal factors of military intervention, Staniland
then proposed a combination of them producing 12 predictions of patterns for military
intervention (Staniland, 2008, p. 339). He then applied this framework in a comparative study
between India and Pakistan trying to explain the different trajectories that both militaries took
and explaining patterns which previous theories failed to explain (Staniland, 2008, pp. 344-362).
There is another line of literature dealing with civilian control from the point of view of coupproofing (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2011; Quinlivan, 1999). However, in this thesis, we are targeting
the degree of civilian-control in military-dominated political systems, where coup proofing
arguments doesn’t necessarily fit.
For the second definition regarding military effectiveness, whether in interstate or irregular wars,
the question is even more difficult to answer. What is military effectiveness and more
importantly, how to measure it, are the fundamental questions needed to be answered in order to
formulate a solid argument on the relation between civilian control and military effectiveness.
8

Scholars who tried to define military effectiveness often deal with regular warfare rather than
irregular ones. For example Stephen P. Rosen (1995) defined Military effectiveness, his
dependent variable, as the amount of defensive and offensive military power which a nation can
generate out of its material resources (Rosen, 1995, p. 6). However, throughout his article, Rosen
failed to give a solid examination or measurements of his dependent variable, military
effectiveness. Although he proposed a measure for the ability to generate offensive military
power as the ability to generate power surplus to the need for maintaining internal order to be
projected abroad, and the ability to generate defensive military power as being able to resist
foreign invasion (Rosen, 1995, p. 27), Rosen didn’t apply such measure systemically, instead, he
based his argument on mere opinions about military effectiveness of different nations e.g. when
he demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the Italian army compared to the more efficient German
one (Rosen, 1995, pp. 19-21). He also used a simple argument about victory and defeat when he
described the subordination of India by a small fraction of the British army despite the huge
disparity between India and Britain in both numbers and material in the favor of the Indians
(Rosen, 1995, pp. 22-23). This method may provide guidance on how to measure military
effectiveness generally, however it’s utility to my purpose is limited due to its specific
dependence on evidence from interstate, regular and symmetric wars while our question is about
military effectiveness in asymmetric, intrastate more irregular forms of conflict.
Risa Brooks (2006) used interstate regular wars of 1967 and 1973 between Egypt and Israel to
demonstrate how the efficiency of the Egyptian army significantly improved between 1967 and
1973 (Brooks, 2006, p. 397). Brooks stated that one of the values of her study is to offer scholars
and analysts tools to measure their states’ military effectiveness (Brooks, 2006, p. 401). In
pursuit of her promise, Brooks offerd her readers a definition of military effectiveness not very
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different from what was offered by Rosen as mentioned above. According to Brooks, military
effectiveness is “the attributes of the military organization- as reflected in its internal military
activities- that allow it to take its human and material strength and translate them into power on
the battlefield” (Brooks, 2006, p. 406). She also noted that military effectiveness is just one
factor among many which affects a nation’s probability to success in war (Brooks, 2006, p. 406).
More importantly, Brooks then discussed some of these “internal military activities” which can
reflect the ability of the military organization to translate its strength into power on the battlefield
and which she thinks is affected by the balance of power between civil and military leaders
(Brooks, 2006, p. 406). However Brook’s approach doesn’t seem to fulfill our purpose of
examining military effectiveness in irregular intrastate wars due to the nature of evidence she
used which is derived solely from interstate regular wars.
Some scholars, given the type of their studies, preferred a more quantitative approach in
measuring military effectiveness. Michael Beckley (2010) used a quantitative approach to his
measurement of military effectiveness, the loss exchange ratio (LER)(Beckley, 2010; Biddle &
Long, 2004).
However, all of these literature dealing with military effectiveness depended, in their analysis, on
evidence form regular interstate wars rather than conflicts which included a non-state irregular
insurgency. On the other hand, Ron Tira, dealt with military effectiveness in both cases, regular
and irregular conflicts, trying to review Carl von Clausewitz’s condition for military decision in
battles and questioning its applicability in irregular wars against non-state actors (Tira, 2010).
Tira studied three cases where the Israeli military had to fight non-state irregular actors, namely
the PLO in 1982, Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in 2008. In his book, Tira differentiates between
two terms, military effectiveness and military decision. He came up with a conclusion that, a
10

nation’s military, is not said to have achieved decision in an irregular warfare, against a non-state
enemy, in a certain period of time, as long as this enemy maintains a residual defiance capability
during the course of this period. That is, as long as the irregular enemy is able to inflicting blows
to the nations’ strategic center of gravity (Tira, 2010). I have benefited from Tira’s argument in
developing the measure of military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency (see
methodology).
As it can be observed, there is very few literature dealing with civilian control in militarydominated political Systems and even fewer dealing with state’s military effectiveness against
irregular non-state insurgencies. More importantly, there is a near complete absence of literature
linking the degree of civilian control over the military, in military-dominated political systems,
with its military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency.
This academic gap is coupled with the fact that we are living in a world where the majority of
conflicts are increasingly irregular and states are trying to explore its military’s capability to
wage war against irregular non-state insurgencies. In this kind of war, where traditional military
doctrine is unable to answer its needs and can’t measure its outcome, a thorough academic effort
is necessary to explore such realms of security policy making. Having said that, it’s our desire
that this thesis would be a useful addition to such efforts in understanding both the dynamics of
civil-control in military-dominated political systems and its relationship with a state’s military
effectiveness against irregular insurgencies through examining two very important countries in
the international arena, Turkey and Pakistan.
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II-

Methodology:

In order to examine the present question, namely, does increasing the degree of civilian control,
in military dominated political systems, have a positive impact on military effectiveness in
suppressing an insurgency?, I am going to use qualitative comparative case study analysis of
Turkey and Pakistan and their conflict with the Kurdish Worker’s party (PKK) and the Taliban
Movement in Pakistan (TTP) respectively, during different time periods. Although this method
doesn’t provide definite answers, it may be the best method to examine issues with a limited
number of cases (Small-N problem) like the present issue (Lim, 2006, p. 20). In a global trend of
democratization and an increased demand on civil and political rights, there are relative few
cases, in the contemporary world, of military-dominated political systems. The problem is
exacerbated because the question also demands a case where this military-dominated political
system is engaged in an irregular warfare with an insurgency, adding this dimension, limits the
availability of cases to a very few number. Comparative case study analysis in this contest
becomes more useful than other methods, if suitable case selection is done, in insuring some
measure of control and develop a deep understanding of the issue in hand (Lim, 2006, p. 20;
Neuman, 2005, pp. 157-158).
The scope of this thesis includes eight time periods which represents eight distinct cases in the
history of both Turkey and Pakistan. These time periods is selected according to their relevance
to the conflict under analysis and variance between them in the degree of civilian control.
The degree of civilian control in each case is evaluated according to a four flanged criteria and
subsequently ranked from the case with maximum civilian control to the minimum.
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Military effectiveness, of the Turkish and Pakistani armies to suppress the respective insurgency,
is then assessed during each of these eight cases. This assessment is done by measuring the
ability, of the insurgency under study, PKK in case of Turkey and TTP in case of Pakistan, to
demonstrate defiance capability, or in other words, its capability to launch attacks. Therefore,
military effectiveness against an insurgency during a specific case (time period), is said to
increase, as the yearly average of attack incidents by the respective insurgency decreases during
this time period.
Finally, this study compares these two variables, namely, degree of civilian control and military
effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency, during different cases, in order to answer the present
question.
The eight cases, under the scope of this analysis, includes six in Turkey and two in Pakistan.
The Turkish cases are; Case One: the period of military rule in Turkey after 1980 coup between
(1980 and 1982), Case Two: Özal’s 1st period between (1983 and 1986), Case Three: Özal’s 2nd
period between (1987 and 1993), Case Four: post- Özal period between (1993 and 1997), Case
Five: the period of legislative reform between (1997 and 2002) and Case Six: Justice and
Development party (AKP) rule between (2003 and 2014). The two Pakistani cases include; Case
Seven: General Pervez Musharraf direct military rule between (1999 and 2008) and Case Eight:
the subsequent period of elected civilian governments between (2008 and 2014).
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The degree of civilian control is evaluated in each case according to the following criteria:


Criterion no.1) in any military chain of command, the top two are the head of the
government, in our cases, the prime minister, and the secretary of defense, and both are
civilians.



Criterion no.2) the power of discussing and approving defense budget lies totally
outside the military establishment or vested in a government body dominated by
civilians.



Criterion no.3) the military didn’t engage directly in maintaining internal security, in
suppressing public uprising or civil-violence, for the period of the studied case.



Criterion no.4) national security and foreign policy decision making, is completely
vested in civilian institutions or in government bodies dominated by civilians. .



Notes:
 The degree of civilian control, in each case, would be stronger as it fulfills one of
these criteria after another.

For my second variable, namely, military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency, the
researcher borrows Tira’s concept stated earlier “A nation’s military is not effective in an
asymmetric warfare against an irregular enemy in a certain period of time as long as this enemy
maintains a residual defiance capability during the course of this period. That is, as long as the
irregular enemy is able to inflicting blows to the nations’ strategic center of gravity” (Tira,
2010).
Military effectiveness during each period is, therefore, assessed by its ability to suppress
offensive capability of the insurgency it is fighting. The offensive capabilities of each
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insurgency, the PKK and the TTP respectively, is measured by the yearly average number of
attacks, it had been able to launch, during each time period. All data, regarding insurgency attack
incidents, is extracted from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)1. GTD is managed by the
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the
University of Maryland. It is considered one of the most comprehensive, reliable and widely
accepted open-access data base, for terrorism related incidents, available for researches and
academics (Lee, 2008). It has been used to conduct many studies such as; "Terrorist Incidents in
India, 1998-2004: A Quantitative Analysis of Fatality Rates." (Borooah, 2009) and “Fighting
Terrorism through the Rule of Law? (Choi, 2010).
Finally, the analysis of the degree of civilian control and military effectiveness, during each case
(time-period) is coupled and compared, Turkey against Pakistan generally and all cases against
each other specifically, to derive answers on whether civilian control is positively related with
military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency and to explore other factors which may be
more relevant.

1

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global Terrorism
Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
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III-

Case selection:

As mentioned above, I am going to use a comparative case study analysis of Turkey and
Pakistan. But why these specific cases?
Turkey and Pakistan have many similarities which would act as good control for some
incontrollable factors. Turkey and Pakistan have the same dominant religion, as they are both
predominantly Sunni Muslim counties (Nation-Master, 2015), they, also, have some degree of
parity in the strength of their respective armed forces (Global-firepower, 2015), their armed
forces occupy a very prestigious and central position in the respective modern history of both
nations which is perceived to be the state builder, the most sophisticated and effective state
apparatus (Barany, 2009; Sakallioğlu, 1997; Varol, 2013), a savior of the state (Singh &
Hickman, 2013) and, more importantly, have always been interested in politics which is
represented by their repeated and recurrent interventions in political affairs. Turkey suffered
from four military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. On the other side, the Pakistani
military staged three coups in 1958, 1977 and 1999.
Another useful similarity, is that both militaries were engaged in a bitter irregular conflict with a
non-state insurgency. The Turkish military had been in direct war with the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) since the 1980’s. This conflict had caused an estimated causalities between 35000
and 40000, many of them are civilians and members of Turkish security forces (Eccarius-Kelly,
2011, p. 19). The Pakistani military, also, has always been facing irregular non-state insurgency
threats represented by separatists’ movements in the troublesome Baluchistan region (Singh &
Hickman, 2013, p. 42). And later by the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) and other Islamist
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militant groups in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other regions (Fair, 2011a,
pp. 121-128).
If these many similarities between Turkey and Pakistan are useful, their differences are even
more interesting. The modern Turkish state was established, from the beginning and for more
than twenty years between 1923 and 1945, as a single-party autocracy ruled by two military
commanders, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and lsmet Inonu respectively (Singh & Hickman, 2013, p.
41). Pakistan, on the other hand, from its independence in 1947, was intended to become a
parliamentary democracy had it not faced later misfortunes (Barany, 2009; Singh & Hickman,
2013, p. 42).
Another distinction, is the difference in the nature of interventions exercised by the two
militaries. While the Turkish military establishment didn’t remain in direct power for long period
of times and quite fulfilled its return to democracy promises after each intervention by
surrendering power to elected civilian parties, the Pakistani military sought long periods of direct
martial rule by the coup leader, causing Pakistan to endure long periods of direct military rule
e.g. between (1958 and 1970), (1977 and 1980) and between (1999 and 2008) (Singh &
Hickman, 2013, p. 50). According to Eric Nordlinge’s typology of military political involvement
patterns, the Turkish military usually acted according to the “moderator” or the “Guardian” type
(Tachau & Heper, 1983, p. 17), while the Pakistani military have always assumed the “ruler”
type in all its interventions.
Although both states may seem to have close civil-military relations’ trajectories, the
contemporary reality of both is largely different. While Turkey have been relatively successful in
pursuing a steady path towards taming its military (Aydınlı, 2012), Pakistan is, by large, still
suffering from its poor civil-military relations, moreover, its military institution is still wielding a
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great deal of influence, if not complete autonomy, on matters of national security and foreign
policy(Ganguly, 2015).
While turbulence of civil-military relations, in Turkey and Pakistan, covers almost the entire of
these two countries’ history, this study derives evidence from certain periods of history when
there were a variance in the degree of civilian control and an ongoing conflict with an
insurgency.
For Turkey, this research focuses on the period between 1980 and 2014. This period starts with
the 1980 military coup and the beginning of the armed conflict with the Kurdistan workers’ Party
(PKK) (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 21; Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, p. 2), and ends in 2014. This period
captures the conflict with the PKK from its beginning and covers almost all its phases, also this
period have witnessed a variety in the degree of civilian control over the military witnessing two
military coups in 1980 and 1997, the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its
unwavering path towards near-complete civilian control over the military (Aydınlı, 2012).
As for Pakistan, the focus of this study is on the period of the state’s struggle with the Tehreek-eTaliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) which started officially in 2007 with the announcement of the
establishment of the TPP (Fair, 2011a, p. 123). Although TPP was officially established in 2007,
its origins can be traced as early as 2004 (Zaidi, 2010). Although civil-military relations in
Pakistan is still suffering the lack of civilian control over the military, this period have witnessed
some changes in the balance of power between civilians and the military. During the first phase
of the conflict (2004-2008), the Pakistani politics was completely controlled by a military
commander, General Pervez Musharraf. The second phase of the conflict (2008-2014) witnessed
the return of elected civilian prime ministers to the center of politics.
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Through examining the degree of civilian control and insurgency attack incidents in each of the
eight cases, under the scope of this analysis (see methodology), in both countries in a
comparative case study analysis, the influence of changing degrees of civilian control, on
military effectiveness in irregular conflict with an insurgency, can be observed.
Note here that, the end point of this analysis is the year 2014, which is the last year of available
data in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)2, from which I have derived data about insurgency
attack incidents.

2

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global Terrorism
Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
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CHAPTER THREE
The Degree of Civilian Control
This Chapter analyzes the degree of civilian control in all of the eight cases (time periods) under
the scope of this study, after a brief historical account, in order to put them in the right context.
Part One: analyzing the degree of civilian control in the six cases of Turkey:
I-

Historical background on Turkey between (1923 and 1980)

Since the formation of Modern Turkey by its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish
republic was ruled by military commanders. Ataturk, a military commander himself, ruled
Turkey followed by his companion lsmet Inonu, also a military commander. They both ruled
Turkey through an authoritarian single-party system from 1923 to 1945 (Singh & Hickman,
2013, p. 41).
Establishing a multi-party system, after two decades of single-party rule, brought the new
Democratic Party to power after winning the 1950 elections under the leadership of Celal Bayar
and Adnan Menderes (Tachau & Heper, 1983, p. 20). In 1960, after being called by the
government to suppress youth protests, the military decided to stage a coup and remove the
democrats from office (Tachau & Heper, 1983, p. 21). This coup sat the stage, as discussed
below, to the legitimization of military interference in politics. During this period, Iraqi Kurds
revolted, and the Turkish military increased its presence in the Kurdish provinces to prevent
similar revolts (Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, pp. 106-107). This may represent the beginning of viewing
the Kurdish problem in a pure military mindset, in the new republic of Turkey.
In the aftermath of the 1960 coup, the 1961 constitution came out with a profound military input.
The new constitution created another legislative body, different electoral system, a constitutional
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court and, more importantly, the National Security Council (Tachau & Heper, 1983, p. 22). The
National Security Council ((Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) or MGK, was intended to legalize military
interference in everyday politics due to the very large mandate given to it by the 1961
constitution which was further strengthened in 1983 constitution (Karabelias, 2008, p. 460).
Between the years 1965 and 1971, weak and in-cohesive governments came to power. Increased
political violence and civil disorder and the inability of the government to counter them, lead the
military to stage their second coup in 1971 to restore public order.
Leftist organizations thrived during this period in the mid-1970’s and the early 1980’s including
the Turkish Worker’s Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) or the PKK, the separatist militant
organization which is the focus of this analysis (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 2; Eccarius-Kelly,
2011, p. 22). Another coup followed in 1980 for similar reasons of weak coalition governments
unable to restore internal order (Varol, 2013, p. 741). The 1982 constitution created a political
system with two heads, the council of ministers and the National Security Council, with the latter
becoming the real body running Turkey after 1993 (Karabelias, 2008, p. 460).
The autonomy of the military and its influence on Turkish politics increased through several
mechanisms embedded in the 1982 constitution. The mandate of the National Security Council
(MGK) was extended, its recommendations were given a special priority in the council of
ministers decisions and its military membership were extended on the expense of civilians.
Originally, the MGK was made to discuss matters of national security, given this new status, and
due to enlargement of the notion of national security, the MGK ended up involved in a wide
range of issues including setting school curricula, appointing civil servants in the southeast and
proposing coalition formation between political parties (Sakallioğlu, 1997, pp. 157-158). The
National Security Council MGK, later, became the most important government body dealing
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with the Kurdish question and the war with the PKK (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, pp. 143-145) The
1982 constitution also increased the power of the president, who, at this time, had always came
from the military (Sakallioğlu, 1997, p. 159).
In the following sections, I am going to apply the criteria of the degree of civilian control, which
I have illustrated in the methodology section, on each of the eight cases under the scope of this
analysis.
II-

Case One: the period of direct military rule between (1980 and 1983):

First case to be analyzed is the three years of direct military rule following the 1980 coup from
1980-1983 (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). During this period, all of the criteria of civilian control was
violated. There were no elected government, no civilian leadership at all, the army had been
directly involved in establishing internal order and ending political violence, as this was the
principle reason behind the coup in the first place. All decisions, regarding national security and
foreign policy, were completely made by military commanders in the absence of any elected
civilian government. This period, therefore, represents the lowest possible point from the
perspective of civilian control, in other words, it represents the complete absent of civilian
control.
This period witnessed the rise of the PKK as a Kurdish insurgency intended to advance Kurdish
interests through using violence. The PKK also took a big advantage of the brutal tactics, used by
the military in dealing with Kurdish population, in promoting their propaganda and increasing
their recruitment abilities. This demonstrates the negative consequences of a direct military rule
on counter-insurgency efforts and may represent one of the intervening variables linking civilian
control to military effectiveness in combating insurgency.
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III-

Case Two and Three: Özal’s period between (1983 and 1993):

The second and third cases was during, Turgut Özal’s period, which is between (1983 and
1993). This period can be divided into two sections, the first is between (1983 and 1989), when
Özal was the Prime-minster and Kenan Evren, the 1980 coup leader, was the president. The
second case in Özal’s period was between (1989 and 1993), when Özal assumed the position of
the president and enjoyed both a majority in the Parliament and a prime-minister from his own
Party (Karabelias, 1999, p. 136). As president, Özal’s tried to curtail the military rule in politics.
His attempts to assert civilian supremacy included creating local governorships with
extraordinary powers and exercising unprecedented powers over the National Intelligence
Agency. He also replaced military liaisons in government with civilian administrators, brought to
the public sphere the issue of military budget and declared his intension to make the chief of the
general staff report to the minister of defense. He overruled the recommendation of the high
command to the position of the chief of the general staff and appointed another general of his
choice. More importantly Özal interfered with issues of national security and foreign policy
including the Kurdish issue which were considered before as a taboo by the army (Karabelias,
2008, p. 459).
Applying the criteria of civilian control on these two periods, the following can be concluded;
Case Two (Özal’s first period), saw the fulfilment of only half of the criterion no.1, where the
elected civilian prime-minister, Özal, shared the decision making on national security and
foreign policy of the Turkish state with a president from the military establishment and a
National Security Council (MGK) clearly dominated by military commanders. Ümit Cizre
Sakallioğlu, argue that, contrary to the wide held believe, Özal actually couldn’t have conducted
any of his policies hadn’t it been approved by the leader of the 1980 coup, the president at the
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time, General Kenan Evren (Sakallioğlu, 1997, p. 158). The military wasn’t directly involved in
maintaining internal security fulfilling criterion no. 3. The other two criteria was not fulfilled.
The national security and foreign policy decisions (criterion no.4) was vested in the militarydominated MGK. The issue of military budget (criterion no. 2) was totally out of the civilian
sphere of influence and was prohibited from discussion in the parliament or any other civilian
institution (Sakallioğlu, 1997, p. 160). It can be said that, through Özal’s first period, there were
low to medium degree of civilian control fulfilling, partially, only 2 of the proposed 4 criteria.
For Case Three, Özal’s second period, he assumed the position of the president. During this
period, Özal clearly fulfilled criterion no.1 through dominating the highest two civilian position
and trying to subjugate the military high-command to the civilian defense ministry (Karabelias,
1999, p. 137). Criterion no.3 (military internal intervention) was also fulfilled due to the absence
of internal security challenges. Özal also advocated subjugating the issue of military budget to
civilian scrutiny breaking the old taboo on the issue (criterion no.2) (Karabelias, 1999, p. 137).
Criterion no.4, however, was still partially fulfilled due to the presence of the National Security
Council (MGK) which was still dominated by military commanders and still wielded large
influence on matters of national security and foreign policy, in spite of Özal’s repeated attempts
to dominate decisions in these arena. In Case Three, Özal achieved a medium to high degree of
civilian control fulfilling at least 2 criteria fully and boldly challenging the military in the other
two.
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IV-

Case Four: post Özal period between (1993 and 1997):

Case Four in this analysis would be the “post Özal period” between (1993 and 1997). In the
years following the sudden death of Özal in 1993, the military was able once more to
reconsolidate their grip on Turkish politics due to the relative weaknesses of political leaders
after Özal, their intra-party rivalries and their need for the military support to consolidate their
position in their respective parties. Following Özal’s death, Suleyman Demirel assumed the
office of the presidency and Tansu Çiller was appointed as the new prime-minister. After a
serious of elections held between 1994 and 1996, the political arena of the Turkish republic
witnessed the rise of an Islamist party, the Welfare Party. The welfare party formed a coalition
government with the True Path Party. On June 28th 1996, for the first time in its history, the
prime minister of the long-time secular republic, was a stern Islamist, Necmettin Erbakan
(Yavuz, 1997, p. 63). Yet on the last day of February 1997, in the wake of a political scandal, the
MGK issued the Erbakan-led government a list of 18 points to be implemented without delay
including curtailing “reactionary Islam”. In the face of a military coup threat, Erbakan and his
cabinet resigned (Ozel, 2003, p. 87).
This period was characterized by unstable relatively weak civilian governments led by civilian
leaders who, most of their time, focused on strengthen their political positions and aligning
themselves with the military trying to avoid alienating them (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, pp. 137139). Moreover, this period ends by a direct military intervention which led to the overthrow of
the elected government.
Although some political leaders, e.g. Çiller and Erbakan, tried to boast civilian control, they
faced a little degree of success and therefore, this period as a whole can be said to be
characterized by low to very low degree of civilian control over the military with almost all the
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4 criteria violated with the exception of criterion no.3 and occasional trials by political leaders to
fulfill criterion no.1 with mixed success. For example, at the beginning of her term as a prime
minister in 1993, Çiller wanted to curve her own picture outside the shadow of the more
experienced president. She proposed ideas like creating a parliamentary body resembling the
National Security Council and non-military solutions to the Kurdish problem, however, under
pressure from the military and her competition with the president, she gave up those progressive
ideas and resorted to the traditional positions preferred by the military and turned over the
conduct of the Kurdish problem and subsequently the war with the PKK insurgency, entirely to
the military (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, pp. 136-138). Due to prime minister’s Necmettin Erbakan’s
desire not to alienate the military further, he also aligned himself with the military position in the
Kurdish issue and , as his predecessor, left the situation in the southeast and the war with the
PKK to the military (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, pp. 106-107).
V-

Case Five: the period of legislative reform between (1997 and 2002):

The Fifth case of this analysis is the period in between (1997 and 2002), this period can be called
“the period of legislative reform” which is after the post-modern coup of 1997. This is the
period which witnessed a serious of legislative reforms in 1999, 2001 and 2002 aiming to
revolutionize civil-rights, political rights and civil-military relations (Özbudun, 2007). Civilian
control was also enhanced by the formation of a strong and effective coalition government in
1999 led by Bulent Ecevit, Devlet Bahceli, and Mesut Yilmaz. Some of These leaders challenged
the military publically and criticized their influence on politics as demonstrated by the crisis
which erupted between Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz and the military leadership in 1998 (Varol,
2013, p. 741). This period can be said to have fulfilled Criterion No. 1 partially and Criterion no.
3 completely and failed to fulfill both Criteria No. 2 and 4. Therefore this case can be classified
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as having low to medium degree of civilian control, which is not as high as Case Three, Özal’s
second period, and not as low as, Case Four, the post- Özal era.
VI-

Case Six: the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Rule between (2003 and 2014):

The sixth case in this analysis, is the period of the Justice and development Party (AKP) rule
between (2002 and 2011). It is been obvious that the AKP, under the leadership of its charismatic
leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had been successful in curtailing the military influence in politics
and establishing nearly complete degree of civilian control. From the point of its stunning win in
2002 general elections, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey sought to embark on
solving the problem of military dominance over politics. It benefited from curbing military
constitutional prerogatives in 1999, 2001, 2002 constitutional amendments of 1982 constitution.
Through these amendments , the parliament changed the structure of the National Security
Council (MGK), the historical avenue of military interference in politics, increased the number
of civilian in its membership to be superior to that of the military, asserted its advisory role,
removed the ban on civilians to hold the position of its secretary general and curbed its executive
powers (Karabelias, 2008, p. 461; Özbudun, 2007, p. 193). The parliament also passed a number
of reform packages for some laws regarding the National Security Council (MGK) in order to
decrease its executive powers. One example of these packages is the Seventh Harmonization
Package of (Law # 4963) which entered into force on the 7th of August 2003 (Özbudun, 2007, p.
194). In his paper Özbudun, acknowledges the fact that, all these constitutional reforms, doesn’t
end the military influence in politics, which can only be weakened through strengthen the
legitimacy of civilian governments (Özbudun, 2007, p. 195). The AKP government, led by
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, fulfilled this requirement to a large extent, and reinforced its legitimacy
through winning national elections of 2007, 2011, 2015 and subsequent parliament majority for
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the next 17 years, allowing it to rule Turkey alone for all these years with remarkable success in
all fields. In July of 2011, the army chief of staff resigned in protest to the AKP’s policies on
staff promotions, followed by the chiefs of the air force and the Navy, which consolidated the
AKP’S grab on power and supremacy over the military (Taşpınar, 2015).
To sum up, The AKP reaped the benefits of parliament-approved constitutional amendments, in
the period of legislative reform, which curtailed military powers in the MGK rendering it a
civilian-dominated advisory government body. With the most resilient obstacle in the face of
civilian control tamed, the AKP succeeded in fulfilling criterion no.4, where national security
and foreign policy decisions is made in civilian-dominated government bodies. Their fulfilment
of criterion no.3 was clearly evident in their managing of the 2013 Taksim-square youth protests
without inviting the army to intervene (Becatoros & Keaten, 2013). As for military budget
(criterion no.2), the situation is far from the traditional taboo, now, the parliament openly
discusses the budget, have debates about it and announce it for public scrutiny (Kemal, 2014). It
can be observed that, the AKP have fulfilled almost all the 4 criteria achieving a high degree of
civilian control. However, it is worth noting here that Turkish civilians haven’t reached yet a
complete degree of civilian control which resembles that of modern western democracies, rather,
the Turkish military still exercise a degree of influence and pressure on civilian leaders
(Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, pp. 128-129).
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Part Two: Analyzing the degree of civilian control in the two cases of Pakistan:
Pakistan has witnessed three military coups in 1958, 1977 and 1999. For the purpose of this
analysis, the focus is on two distinct periods of Pakistani politics between (1999 and 2015).
I-

Case Seven: General Musharraf’s Direct Military rule:

Case Seven is between (1999 and 2008), This period witnessed the direct military rule of
General Pervez Musharraf (Singh & Hickman, 2013, p. 45). It resembles the period of the
military junta rule in Turkey following the 1980 coup, the only exception is that the Pakistani
case lasted for 9 years in contrast to 3 years in the Turkish one. During this period none of the
four criteria of civilian control was fulfilled, pushing the degree of civilian control to its minimal
level, or in other words, civilian control was completely absent and for an extended period of
time. A serious of actions done by Musharraf completely consolidated his military rule. After the
2002 referendum and elections, it was apparent that Musharraf was intending to consolidate his
military rule (Talbot, 2002, p. 325), For example, in summer of 2002, he announced
constitutional changes, in August, he issued “the Legal Framework Order”, which expanded his
presidential powers to unprecedented realms including; the power to dissolve the Parliament,
dismiss elected officials and appoint military commanders (El-Khawas, 2009, pp. 98-99).
Another example is the formation of a military-dominated National Security Council which
resembled the MGK of Turkey (El-Khawas, 2009, p. 99). By October 2004, Musharraf held
dually the positions of the president and the army chief, had a prime minister and a parliamentary
majority from the party he secretly established and have weakened all other major political
parties (El-Khawas, 2009, pp. 100-103).
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II-

Case Eight: post Musharraf democratic period between (2008 and 2014):

This case is in the period immediately following the end of General Musharraf’s Rule after his
defeat in February 2008 (Nelson, 2009, p. 16). This case covers the period between (2008 and
2014). This period witnessed the rule of elected civilian governments and the first peaceful
transition of power from a civilian government to another after 2013 general elections. However,
the winning party, led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, still faced mass opposition protests and
allegations of poll rigging (Jaspal, 2015 pp. 69-74). The Pakistani elected civilians may have
achieved partial success in criterion no.1, where the head of the government is an elected civilian
leader, however, it is clearly evident that they, the civilian leaders, are facing a complete failure
in wielding power in the areas of national defense and foreign policy decision making (Yusuf,
2014, p. 92). For example, in 2009, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, was
given an unprecedented extended term as the army chief, which proved the inability of the
civilian leaders to manage national security policy independent from the army commanders
(Fair, 2011b, p. 101). Also, at the climax of political crisis of 2013, one of the opposition leaders,
Imran Khan, organized a huge march in the Pakistani capital. When the police seemed unable to
handle the situation, Sharif called the army to help the police in restoring public order. The
government asked a military commander to mediate between it and Imran khan (Jaspal, 2015
pp.72). This demonstrates the civilian leadership dependence on the military to provide internal
security and mediate between rival civilian groups, largely violating criterion no.3. With criteria
no.1, 3 and 4 violated, civilians can only be said to have achieved a very low degree of civilian
control. Some scholars, e.g. Savail Hussain and Mehreen Malik, argue that, in such a turbulent
environment of civil-military relations, no comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy can be
drafted (Yusuf, 2014, p. 94).
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In conclusion, the degree of civilian control, for Turkey, can be described in six distinct cases
between (1980 and 2014). Case One between (1980 and 1983), the degree of civilian control
was at its minimum level, Case Two between (1983 and 1989), during Özal’s first period, the
government enjoyed low to medium degree of civilian control. Case Three, Özal’s second
period, between (1989 and 1993), he enjoyed a medium degree of civilian control. In the postÖzal period, Case Four, between (1993 and 1997), the degree of civilian control was at a very
low level. Case Five, during the era of legislative reforms between (1997 and 2002), Turkey
witnessed a low to medium degree of civilian control and the beginning of real democratization.
Finally, during Case Six, the AKP and its leaders were, eventually, able to achieve high degree
of civilian control fulfilling almost all of this study’s four criteria.
In Pakistan between (1999 and 2014) can be divided into two cases. Case Seven is between
(1999 and 2008) during General Musharraf’s rule, witnessed no civilian control at all. Case
Eight, between (2008 and 2015), saw only limited degree of civilian control.
Table (1) shows the ranking of the previous eight cases according to the degree of civilian
control. From this ranking, it can be seen that, the state of civilian control, in Turkey, is far more
advanced than in Pakistan. Five out of six of the Turkish cases proved to be better than any
Pakistani case, with significant increase in the degree of civilian control over time. On the other
side, for Pakistan, its two cases are lagging behind in the ranking constituting two of the lowest
three cases in this analysis.
In the following Chapter, military effectiveness of the armies of both Turkey and Pakistan, is
compared, during the overall period of analysis and in each of the eight cases specifically, in
combating the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP)
respectively.
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Case

Time period

Country

Degree of civilian control

Ranking

(Case Six)

20031 - 2014

Turkey

High degree of civilian

#1

AKP Party Rule

control

(maximum)
(Case Three)

1989 - 1993

Turkey

2nd Özal’s period
(Case Five)

Medium degree of civilian

#2

control
1997 - 2002

Turkey

The period of legislative

Low to Medium degree of

#3

civilian control

reform in Turkey
(Case Two)

1983 - 1989

Turkey

1st Özal’s period
(Case Four)

#4

civilian control
1993 - 1997

Turkey

post-Özal period
(Case Eight)

Low to medium degree of

Very low to low degree of

#5

civilian control
2008 -2014

Pakistan

Pakistani civilian rule after

Very low degree of civilian

#6

control

Musharraf
(Case One)

1980 - 1983

Turkey

Military junta rule after

No civilian control - only

#7

limited period

1980 coup in Turkey
(Case Seven)

1999 - 2008

Pakistan

General Musharraf’s rule

No civilian control +
extended period

(minimum)

Table (1): ranking of the eight cases according to the degree of civilian control
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#8

CHAPTER FOUR
Military Effectiveness
In this chapter, the effectiveness of the militaries of both Turkey and Pakistan in suppressing the
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and Taliban Movement of Pakistan (TTP) respectively, is
measured, during the overall time period of the analysis and in each of the previous eight cases,
in order to examine this study’s main question, does military effectiveness against an insurgency
increases with the increase of the degree of civilian control?
However, it is essential, first, to embark on a brief account about the origins of both conflicts,
before analyzing, in detail, military effectiveness during each of the eight cases.
I-

The origins of the Turkish conflict with the PKK:

The Kurdish Workers Party or Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), was first established in the
mid 1970’s as a Marxist-Leninist militant student organization, under the leadership of Abdullah
Öcalan. The PKK held its first secret congress in 1978 (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 22; EccariusKelly, 2011, p. 2). In the midst of rising political violence and subsequent military coup of 1980,
the PKK leaders, including Öcalan, fled to the neighboring Syria, where they lived, organized
themselves and trained under the sponsorship of the Syrian regime (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p.
22). The brutal repression of the Kurdish population in the southeastern provinces under the
military-coup regime in the early 1980’s, cultivated necessary circumstances for the development
and thrive of the PKK as a militant organization (Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, pp. 110-111). The PKK
started its first insurgency in 1984 in order to liberate the Kurdish people and establish the
independent Kurdistan state (Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, pp. 3,111-112). On August 15th, 1984, the
PKK launched two simultaneous guerilla attacks against Turkish forces, this event marked the
beginning of the thirty-years armed conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish separatist
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insurgency, which remains unconcluded until the time of performing this study (Özcan, 2012, p.
195).
II-

The origins of the Pakistani conflict with the TTP:

Around the year 2004, some groups of Islamic militants began operating under the name of
“Taliban Pakistan” in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Pashtun settled
areas in northwestern Swat. These groups successfully established Islamic sharia law in large
swaths of land under their control (Fair, 2011a, p. 122). In 2007, it was officially announced that
an umbrella organization called “Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan” (TTP), was established under
the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed by a US drone attack in 2009 and was
succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsud. Under the leadership of Hakimullah, the TPP consolidated
and intensified its operations against the Pakistani military and security forces (Fair, 2011a).
Until 2010, The Pakistani army had launched a total of four military campaigns against the TTP
in Swat region, the first three witnessed mixed results with a failure to establish permanent
presence or hold ground in the militant regions (Fair, 2011b, p. 103). The 2004 army campaign
in South Waziristan, against Nek Mohammad Wazir, represents a stark example of these failures,
when Nek Mohammad managed to reach a stalemate with the army followed by a peace deal
(Fair, 2011a, p. 124). Only in May 2009, the army was able to launch a successful campaign in
Swat region, code-named Operation Rah-e-Rast (Operation Path of Righteousness), and it was
able to establish law and order in the region, even though, on the expense of local discomfort
from permeant military occupation (Fair, 2011b, p. 103; Yusuf, 2014, pp. 74-75).

34

III-

Comparing the overall effectiveness of the militaries of both Turkey and Pakistan:

In this section, and the following one, the researchers uses data about insurgency attack
incidents, derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)3, to assess the PKK and TTP
ability to launch attacks, in other words, to measure their defiance capability and subsequently
assessing the effectiveness of the Turkish and the Pakistani military in suppressing them
respectively. The yearly average of insurgency attack incidents in each period is used to test if
military effectiveness in each case is positively affected by its ranking in the degree of civilian
control established in the previous chapter.
Figures (1 and 2), describes the number of the attacks of the PKK and the TTP respectively
during all the time period under the scope of this study. Figure (1) describes perfectly the rise of
the PKK first insurgency in the mid-1980’s after the suppressive period of direct military rule
following the 1980 coup in Turkey. It can be seen that the rate of PKK attack incidents had
greatly declined, in less than a decade from the beginning of its rise in 1984. The sharp increase
in the beginning of the 1990’s can be explained by the eruption of the second Gulf war in 1992
and the opening of the Turkish-Iraqi border to the movements of PKK back and forth seeking
refuge and logistical support. Figure (1) also demonstrates the overall suppression of the PKK
attacks between (1995 and 2011), only to increase again in 2011 after the eruption of the Syrian
civil-war in mid-2011 (Rodgers et al, 2015), the increase which didn’t last long before being
suppressed again in less than 3 years. Figure (2), on the other side demonstrates the Pakistani
army’s ineffectiveness and the increasing capability of the TTP to lunch attacks despite the shortlived suppression after 2009 military campaign. It can be seen that, after a full decade from the

3

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global Terrorism
Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
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beginning of the conflict with the TTP in 2004, the Pakistani army is still facing failure in
suppressing the TTP, which is still able, until 2014, to show significant defiance capability
proved by the increasing rate of attack incidents in Pakistan. Comparing these two figures (1
and 2), shows the overall difference in effectiveness between the militaries of both Turkey and
Pakistan in combating the PKK and the TTP respectively, with the former being more successful
in suppressing the insurgency it’s facing. Given the overall superiority of Turkey in the degree of
civilian control, established earlier, this can be used as an evidence on the positive effect of the
degree of civilian control on military effectiveness in irregular warfare against non-state
insurgency. This superiority of the Turkish military effectiveness can also be demonstrated by
the average number of incidents in both countries per year. The average number of incidents of
PKK attacks in Turkey between (1984 and 2014) is 42.4 incidents per year, while, the average
number of TTP attack incidents in Pakistan between (2004 and 2014) is 98 incidents per year. It
can be noticed that the yearly average of TTP attack incidents is more than double that of the
PKK, which demonstrates the far superiority of the TTP over the PKK in showing a defiance
capability and subsequently, the Superiority of the Turkish military over its Pakistani counterpart
in suppressing the insurgency it is facing.
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IV-

Comparing the effectiveness of the militaries of both Turkey and Pakistan during
each of the eight cases :

In this section, the rate of attack incidents of the PKK and the TTP is studied and compared
during each of the eight cases of this analysis.
Figure (3) shows the rate of incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey during Özal’s period between
(1983 and 1993). During this period the PKK launched a total of 797 attacks, which is 79.9
incidents per year. It also can be seen that there was a gradual rise in rate of attacks, a short
decline, a sudden increase in 1992 and a sharp decline by 1994. As noted earlier, this sudden
increase in the number of incidents is due to the first gulf war in 1990-1991. During case two,
during 1st Özal period, between (1983 and 1989), which witnessed a low to medium degree of
civilian control, the PKK launched a total of 112 attacks (Figure-4), which represents 16
incidents per year. In Case three, During Özal’s second period between (1990 and 1992),
which had a medium degree of civilian control, and is the 2nd highest period in the ranking
above, the total number pf PKK attack incidents was 518 incidents (Figure-5), which is 172.6
incidents per year. This sudden increase in PKK offensive capability, as noted before, has
nothing to do with the degree of civilian control, rather, it can be explained by the eruption of the
1st gulf war, which increased the PKK’s tactical and logistical capabilities through porous
borders with a destabilized neighboring Iraq. Figure-5, however, demonstrates the continued
suppression of the PKK during most of the period. It also shows the immediate success of the
Turkish military, during this period, to suppress PKK offensive capabilities by 1992.
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Case Four, during post- Özal period, between 1994 and 1996, the PKK launched a total of 219
attacks, with an average of 73 incidents per year (figure-6). The incidents of PKK attacks were
only high during the first year and it soon declined during 1995 and 1996. This conforms with
the turbulence in the degree of civilian control which followed Özal’s sudden death in 1993.
Figure-7 demonstrates the rate of PKK attack incidents in Case Five during the period of
legislative reform between 1997 and 2002. The PKK launched a total of 56 attacks during this
period, with an average of only 8 incidents per year. It can be noticed that, after 1999, the PKK
attack incidents (its defiance capability) was completely suppressed. This can be attributed to the
arrest of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999, and the subsequent organizational confusion
inside the PKK (Marcus, 2007; Radu, 2002).
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Case Six, during the rule of the AKP party between (2003 and 2014), which is characterized by a
high degree of civilian control and was ranked first among other cases in the scope of this
analysis, the PKK launched a total of 366 attacks (figure -8), an average of 30.5 attack per
year. This high incidence of attacks, however, is attributed to the eruption of the Syrian civil war
in mid-2011 and not to changes in the degree of civilian control. This can be proved by looking
to the pre-war data, namely, the number of incidents between (2003 and 2010), excluding the
years of Syrian unrest between 2011 and 2014. Figure (9) demonstrates the rate of PKK attack
incidents between (2003 and 2010). During this period, the PKK launched a total of 110 attacks,
a yearly average of 13.75 incidents.

42

As for Pakistan, General Musharraf military rule witnessed the beginning of the conflict with the
TTP in 2007, when a group of militant commanders announced that they are operating under the
banner of Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP). The organization also consolidated its structure
under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud in February 2008 (Fair, 2011a, p. 123). Year 2008, also
was the year in which the military rule of General Musharraf came to an end. Therefore, I am
going to use data about TTP attacks between 2008 and 2014, which is the period of civilian rule
after Musharraf and represents Case Eight in this analysis. During this period the TTP launched
a total of 1040 attacks, an average of 148 attacks per year (Figure -10), which is the highest
yearly average rate of attack incidents in all the eight cases in the scope of the present analysis.
This period, also, witnessed the lowest degree of civilian control, apart from the two cases of
direct military rule in both Turkey and Pakistan. This gives credence to the claim that increasing
the degree of civilian control has a positive impact on military effectiveness in irregular warfare
against a non-state insurgency. Table (2) summarizes the previous analysis.
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In conclusion, the analysis of military effectiveness during different cases proved the following.
Generally, the Turkish military is far more superior to its Pakistani counterpart in suppressing
the insurgency it is facing. Case Eight witnessed the highest yearly average of insurgency attack
incidents, which conforms to its low status in the degree of civilian control. Case Five proved to
be the lowest case in terms of yearly average insurgency attack incidents, followed by Case Two
and Case Six. Case Six and Case Three represent two challenging cases to the claim that the
degree of civilian control has a positive impact on military effectiveness in suppressing
insurgency. In The following section, a final conclusion of this study and its implications for
different actors, is presented.
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Time period

Country

Degree of civilian control

Total

Yearly

no. of

average

attacks
(Case Six)

2002 - 2014

Turkey

AKP Party Rule

High degree of civilian

366

30.5

control

(110)

(13.73)

Medium degree of civilian

518

172.6

56

8

112

16

219

73

1040

148

-

-

-

-

(maximum)
(Case Three)

1989 - 1993

Turkey

2nd Özal’s period
(Case Five)

control
1997 - 2002

Turkey

period of legislative

Low to Medium degree of
civilian control

reform in Turkey
(Case Two)

1983 - 1989

Turkey

1st Özal’s period
(Case Four)

civilian control
1993 - 1997

Turkey

the post-Özal era
(Case Eight)

Low to medium degree of

Very low to low degree of
civilian control

2008 -2014

Pakistan

civilian rule after

Very low degree of
civilian control

Musharraf’s era
(Case One)

1980 - 1983

Turkey

Military junta rule after

No civilian control - only
limited period

1980 coup
(Case Seven)

1999 - 2008

Pakistan

General Musharraf’s rule

No civilian control +
extended period

Table (2): comparing insurgency attack incidents during different Cases
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CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion

I-

Final conclusion:

In this thesis, we examine the following question; does the increase in the degree of civilian
control, in military dominated political systems, positively impact military effectiveness against
non-state insurgency in an irregular warfare?
In order to answer this question, this project compared both the degree of civilian control (the
independent variable) and the military effectiveness against non-state insurgency in irregular
warfare (the dependent variable), using comparative case study analysis of both Turkey and
Pakistan and their conflict with The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the Taliban Movement in
Pakistan (TTP) respectively, during different time periods. The scope of this analysis included
eight distinct cases (time periods), six of which was in Turkey and other two in Pakistan. In
Chapter Three, Each case was analyzed against a four flanged criteria to rank them according to
the degree of civilian control over the military during this time period. In Chapter Four,
military effectiveness of the military against the respective insurgency, was examined for each
case (time period). This was done by measuring the extent of the military suppression of the
insurgency it is facing, in other words, to what extent was the respective insurgency able to
demonstrate a defiance capability through the number of attacks it successfully launched during
each case?
Comparing these two variables in different cases, a number of conclusions can be made.
First, Turkey is far superior to Pakistan in the degree of civilian control, with 5 of its 6 cases
proved to be the highest in the ranking. The Turkish military, also, proved to be superior to its
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Pakistani counterpart in suppressing the insurgency it is facing (the PKK). This may provide
evidence of the positive relationship between increased civilian control and military
effectiveness in irregular warfare.
Secondly, the superiority of the Turkish military over its Pakistani counterpart is also
demonstrated by its ability to suppress the PKK in a short period of time after each boast in its
capabilities (see Figure 1). On the other side, the Pakistani military have failed, until now, to
suppress the TTP defiance capability, despite repeated campaigns in areas of its support (Figure
2).
Thirdly, although comparing the cases of Turkey and Pakistan may prove the positive
relationship between civilian control and military effectiveness, comparing Turkish cases against
each other defies this claim, or at least, marginalizes it. Case Three, 2nd Özal’s period, which is
the second highest in the degree of civilian control, witnessed the highest yearly average in the
no. of attacks by the PKK, even higher than the Pakistani cases. This proves the devastating
effect of a destabilized neighbor, in this case Iraq, on military effectiveness in suppressing
insurgency. This effect of a destabilized neighboring country, is also demonstrated by the
increase of the yearly average of PKK attack incidents, during the AKP party rule, after the
eruption of the civil war in Syria in mid-2011 (Figure -8). Both cases, namely, Case Three, 2nd
Özal period and Case Six, AKP rule, are the highest two ranking cases in the degree of civilian
control, however this superiority in civilian control was greatly shadowed by the effect of a
destabilized neighboring country, which boasted the capabilities of the PKK and negated the
effect of civilian control on military effectiveness. However, removing the effect of a
destabilized neighbor, in Case Six of AKP party rule from 2003 to 2010 (Figure -9), we get the
expected result of an effective military related to an increase in civilian control.
47

Fourthly, other factors may also be very crucial in curbing insurgency’s defiance capabilities
other than the degree of civilian control. For example, organizational confusion inside the PKK
following the arrest of its leader in 1999, represented a direct factor behind decreasing its
offensive capabilities to its lowest level in Case Five, during the period between 1997 and 2002
(see figure-7 and Table-2).
Fifthly, Cases Two and Eight, demonstrate the drawbacks of direct military rule on subsequent
civilian governments. In both cases, the insurgencies, PKK in case of Turkey and the TTP in
case of Pakistan, was able to thrive and intensify their capabilities, in the aftermath of a direct
military rule (see figures 1 and 2). This may be due to grievances cultivated after the unopposed
military suppression of local population in insurgency-supporting areas during direct military
rule, which results in increase of population support for the insurgency and a boast in their
recruiting capabilities.
Finally, this thesis provides evidence on the positive relationship between civilian control and
military effectiveness against non-state insurgency. However, it should be noted that this positive
relationship is insufficient, alone, to claim direct causation, especially if this relationship is not
very strong and proved to be overshadowed by other factors , such as a destabilized neighboring
country or organizational confusion inside the insurgency itself.
Looking for other linking variables and causal mechanisms between civilian control and military
effectiveness is essential to assert positive relationship between them. Examples of these causal
factors may include increased military professionalism or more peaceful ways by which civilian
governments tackle its minority problems, rather than harsh ways used by civilian governments
which precipitate grievances and force people to violence.
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Following is the last section about important recommendations based on this conclusion.
II-

Final recommendations:

This thesis provides evidence on possible positive relationship between civilian control and
military effectiveness in combating non-state violent actors. Given the devastating threats such
actors present to peace and security in contemporary world, the following recommendations can
be made:
1- Different United Nations Organs, political convoys and other mediating actors should
take this result in consideration when proposing future political systems in countries
emerging from violent unrest e.g. Libya, Iraq, Yemen and Syria. Future political
orientations in these countries should pay good attention to civil-military balance, in
order to improve its odds against insurgencies it is expected to face.
2- Countries with military-dominated political systems and also facing non-state militant
groups, such as Egypt and Algeria, should move forward in increasing the degree of
civilian control following the footsteps of Turkey, if they want to achieve positive results
facing these militant groups.
3- Different human rights groups, can use the results of this thesis, to prove the devastating
results of severe and violent oppression of minorities, which leaves huge grievances and
boasts capabilities of insurgencies.
4- Since this thesis doesn’t prove causation, the results of this research doesn’t provide
definite answers about the positive effect of civilian control on military effectiveness in
irregular warfare. Therefore, further research in the subject should address possible
linking factors and causal mechanisms between the two variables.
Thank you
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